Human Rights Commission’s Limited Reach on Privacy Breaches

This judicial review application challenged the decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Commission to dismiss a discrimination complaint. The applicant alleged that the Commission erred in its determination of limitation period and lack of jurisdiction over privacy breaches. The respondent argued that the applicant was precluded from bringing a judicial review application as he had not exhausted the remedies available to him under his union’s grievance process. The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court confirmed that the Commission had concurrent jurisdiction to hear the complaint, even though the applicant could have pursued it through a formal grievance with his union, however, the court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission’s decision met the standards of reasonableness and correctness.

Administrative law – Decisions reviewed – Human Rights Commission – Discrimination – Family status – Judicial review – Jurisdiction – Standard of review – Reasonableness – Correctness – Limitations. Remedies – Certiorari

Mitchell v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Human Rights Commission), [2025] N.J. No. 40, Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court – General Division, February 20, 2025, P.N. Browne J.

In Mitchell v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Human Rights Commission), Matthew Mitchell, a teacher employed by the Newfoundland and Labrador English School District (NLESD), sought judicial review of a decision by the Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Commission. The case revolves around Mitchell’s allegations of discrimination and privacy breaches after he raised concerns that his daughter had been bullied at her school. Mitchell claimed that the NLESD retaliated by removing him from his coaching duties and sharing personal information about him, which he believed constituted discrimination based on family status.

Mitchell had been a teacher with the NLESD since 2004. Since 2019, Mr. Mitchell had worked at MacDonald Drive Junior High (the “Junior High”), where he was a teacher and volunteer coach. In spring 2022, Mr. Mitchell brought forth concerns to the NLSED regarding how the school administration of the Junior High had handled bullying incidents involving his daughter, a student at the same school. On June 20, 2022, the NLSED removed Mr. Mitchell from his volunteer coaching duties. The decision was communicated to the school community, and Mitchell felt it damaged his reputation. Mr. Mitchell alleged that his removal was retaliation by the NLSED for his advocacy for his daughter.

Instead of filing a formal grievance under his collective agreement, Mitchell sought to resolve the matter informally with his union and the NLESD. He claimed that he received an email from the NLESD on July 13, 2022, which he believed indicated a resolution to the issue, so he did not pursue a formal grievance. However, in September 2022, Mitchell discovered that information regarding his removal from coaching had been shared by school authorities, which he saw as a breach of privacy and continuing unfair treatment. Mitchell became disabled around the same time and went on long-term disability leave.

Believing that he had been discriminated against based on family status, Mitchell filed a complaint with the Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) on July 11, 2023. He claimed that the NLESD’s actions constituted differential treatment linked to his role as an advocate for his daughter’s wellbeing. Additionally, he alleged that the NLESD had breached his privacy by sharing confidential information.

On December 21, 2023, the Commission dismissed his complaint. It found that the alleged privacy breaches were outside the Commission’s jurisdiction, as they fell under the mandate of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, pursuant to the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (ATIPPA). Moreover, the Commission determined that the limitation period for filing a complaint under the Human Rights Act had expired on June 20, 2023, one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination, which was Mitchell’s removal from his coaching duties.

Mitchell sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission had erred in two key areas: (1) determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the privacy breach allegations, and (2) incorrectly calculating the start of the limitation period for filing his complaint.

The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, representing the NLESD, opposed Mitchell’s application. It argued that Mitchell had not exhausted alternative remedies under his collective agreement and was therefore not entitled to judicial review. Additionally, the province maintained that the Commission’s decision met the reasonableness standard for administrative decisions.

The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court, in a judgment rendered by Justice P.N. Browne, dismissed Mitchell’s application for judicial review. The court applied the standards of reasonableness and correctness to assess the Commission’s decision and found that the Commission had acted within its jurisdiction and had made reasonable determinations regarding the limitation period.

The court considered Mr. Mitchell’s position that the Commission erred when determining it did not have jurisdiction over a complaint relating to a privacy and confidentiality breach. He further submitted that the Commission’s decision lacked reasoning to substantiate a conclusion that third party communications by the Province cannot form the basis for allegations of discrimination. The Commission submitted that privacy-related complaints fall under the Office of the Privacy Commissioner under ATIPPA, and therefore were outside of its jurisdiction.

The court evaluated this issue on the standards of both reasonableness and correctness. The court looked to the legislation, noting that the wording contained in section 3(2)(iv) of ATIPPA clearly demonstrated that the intention of the legislature in creating the Office of the Privacy Commissioner was to provide members of the public with an independent investigation process for privacy complaints. On the other hand, Section 9(1) of the HRA merely sets out a general prohibition against discrimination and provides various enumerated heads under which discrimination may fall. The language of this section, although quite broad, was not intended to subsume any other statutory processes outside the scope of the enumerated heads. Therefore, the Commission’s decision to defer the privacy allegations to the appropriate authority was reasonable and correct.

The court turned to Mitchell’s argument that the Commission erred in the calculation of the limitation period. Mitchell claimed that the limitation period should have started to run on July 13, 2022, when he received an email from the NLESD, which he interpreted as resolving the matter. He also argued that the Commission failed to properly consider the alleged ongoing unfair treatment after his removal from coaching duties.

The court upheld the Commission’s decision that the limitation period for filing a discrimination complaint began on June 20, 2022, when Mitchell was removed from his coaching duties. According to the court, this was the last incident of alleged differential treatment based on family status. The court found that Mitchell failed to demonstrate that the actions taken after June 20, 2022, such as the alleged privacy breaches, were new incidents of discrimination. Therefore, the decision of the Commission to dismiss Mitchell’s complaint, was reasonable.

Lastly, the court considered the province’s argument that Mitchell was disentitled to a judicial review of the Commission’s decision and the remedy of certiorari because he did not exhaust other alternative remedies available through his collective agreement before seeking judicial review. The province argued that allowing Mitchell to proceed with a judicial review of his complaint would be analogous to a collateral attack on the terms of his collective agreement and would defeat the legislature’s intention that labour relations should be a carefully balanced sphere of exclusivity.

Counsel for the Commission also made submissions on this issue, arguing that the wording of the HRA supports for the position that the legislature intended to allow for the Commission to have concurrent jurisdiction over labour relations issues.

The court rejected the province’s argument, finding that although Mitchell had chosen not to pursue a formal grievance, the Commission had concurrent jurisdiction to hear complaints of discrimination, even where the substance of the allegation falls within the grievance process of a collective agreement. Mitchell’s failure to file a grievance did not preclude the Commission from considering his complaint.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Mitchell’s application for judicial review, finding that the Commission’s decision was reasonable and correct in its application of the law. The court ruled that the Commission appropriately determined its lack of jurisdiction over privacy breaches and that it reasonably calculated the limitation period for Mitchell’s discrimination complaint. No order for costs was made, as the court recognized the public interest aspects of the case.

This case was digested by Emma Jerrott of Harper Grey LLP and first published in the LexisNexis® Harper Grey Administrative Law Netletter and the Harper Grey Administrative Law Newsletter. If you would like to discuss this case further, please feel free to contact her directly at [email protected].